Tag Archives: Walmart

People don’t like change. (Or do they?)

I seem to be having a lot of conversations at the moment around whether people (you, me and everyone else) like and embrace change, or whether they resist it. The same question arises for companies. Like a lot of these questions, I think it depends. As individuals we don’t mind change, given appropriate circumstances. Organisations also want to change (and in today’s business environment it seems to be a question of changing or becoming irrelevant). However, people in organisations are usually strongly incentivised to dislike change, especially if they want to make that next repayment on their new mortgage. Fixing this, and creating a culture that embraces change, means changing the way we think about and structure our organisations and our careers. It means rethinking the rules of enterprise IT.

Every time a conversation comes around to the topic of change, I’m always reminded of a visit I made to a Toyota factory something like a decade ago. It’s so long ago now that I can’t even remember the reason for the visit, but that’s not the point of this missive.

Toyota, like most businesses, loves change. (Many large companies reorganise so often that change seems to be the only constant.) Change, embodied in the development of the Toyota Production System, was what took Toyota from the bottom of the global car industry to the top. Change is also why many of us have moved companies, following jobs as our employers reorganise their operations. For some of us, change is an opportunity. For many though, change is the tool of the man as he tries to disrupt our lives. Change means unwanted relocations, pay cuts, career stalls, or the need to shift jobs when we don’t want to. Change is something to be resisted.

What was interesting about my visit to Toyota though, was the attitude of the workers on the shop floor had to change. They didn’t hate it. They didn’t even resist it. They actually arrived at work each day eager to see how work practices had been changed since the end of their last shift.

A Toyota assembly line circa 2000.
A Toyota assembly line circa 2000

The concrete example I saw of this was the pre-sorting of seatbelt parts into coloured tubs. Apparently only a few weeks earlier the parts had been arranged on a wall. All hooks and dangling parts, like your Dad’s tools in the shed. When a car came down the assembly line a worker would select the parts appropriate for the car model, and then attach them to the car. Each seat belt had roughly four parts, so that meant there was three unnecessary decisions. Unnecessary decisions usually mean mistakes, mistakes waste time and money, and there were a number of mistakes made.

One day a member of the shop floor team had had the bright idea of pre-sorting the seat belts to avoid these mistakes. Some coloured tubs were sourced (some of the shop floor team drove to the local Walmart with a little petty cash), parts were sorted into tubs, and they gave the idea a trial run. Selecting seatbelt parts for a car now only required one decision: which tub?

The idea was a huge success; error rates went down dramatically. I hear that it was even taken global, and implemented in most Toyota factories around the world. (Though being around ten years ago, and with today’s rapid pace of change, I expect that the tubs have been superseded by now.)

What’s interesting about this story is that the change originated on the shop floor, from the assembly line worker who were actively looking to improve operations, rather than from head office as part of a reorganisation. Some of the improvements I heard about even resulted in the elimination of jobs, with the workers redeployed elsewhere in the factory. Workers weren’t just changing how they did something, they were also changing what they did. Change was what made the work interesting and engaging for the workers, rather than being seen as an oppressive tool used by the man.

I think we can safely set aside the idea that works don’t like change, as this story is not an isolated incident. Why then, do so many people resist change? Why, for every Toyota factory, there is a story like the UK newspaper industry, where workers (and unions) resisted change for decades, until Rupert Murdoch came along.

Rupert Murdoch, destroyer of unions, and good Melbourne boy
Rupert Murdoch, destroyer of unions, and good Melbourne boy

The problem is not people or organisations, but people in organisations.

People are funny things; they tend to do what you incentivise them to do. There’s an excellent article over at the NY Times, The no-stars all-star, which talks about measurement and incentives in basketball. We often talk about “what gets measured determines what gets done” from an employee incentive point of view, but this article puts some real meat on the bones of that argument.

Shane Battier, the no-stars all-star
Shane Battier, the no-stars all-star

As the article says (on page two):

There is a tension, peculiar to basketball, between the interests of the team and the interests of the individual. The game continually tempts the people who play it to do things that are not in the interest of the group.

A little later it goes on to mention (on page three):

A point guard might selfishly give up an open shot for an assist. You can see it happen every night, when he’s racing down court for an open layup, and instead of taking it, he passes it back to a trailing teammate. The teammate usually finishes with some sensational dunk, but the likelihood of scoring nevertheless declined. “The marginal assist is worth more money to the point guard than the marginal point,” Morey says.

The point guard’s career is defined by the number of assists he makes (among other metrics), and he’ll try and increase the number of assets even if it’s not in the best interest of the team. After all, teams come and go, while he has a career to maintain.

Once you place a person into a role you have put them on a career path which will determine their attitude to change.

Usually we take an operational approach to defining roles, rewarding people for the volume of work they are responsible for. Career progression then means increasing the amount of work they are responsible for, regardless of what this means for the company.

Measuring a project manager in terms of head count or revenue under management will give them a strong preference for creating ever bigger projects. It doesn’t matter if the right thing to do is create more, smaller projects, rather than run a programme of a few major projects as we have in the past. Your project manager’s career path is to increase their head count and revenue under management. And they do have those private school fees due soon.

Just like the point guard, change that will prevent career progression will be resisted (remember those kids in private school), even if it is counter to the company’s best interests. Which makes the current transformation we’re seeing in IT all the more important, because if we set the wrong incentives in place then we just might be our own worst enemies.

We can’t force a square peg into a round hole; nor can we force our existing employees to take their current roles and careers into a new organisational model. They just don’t fit. Take IT for example. We can’t expect many modern IT departments to spontaneously modernise themselves, transforming into agile business-technology engines under their own volition. It’s not that the departments don’t want to change: they do. Nor are most of the employees, as individuals, opposed (remember the Toyota example). But the combination of people and organisation will repel all but the most destructive boarders.

It’s interesting how other games, games other than basketball that is, have structural solutions to this problem. One solution is the line-up in baseball. From the NY Times article (page two, again):

“There is no way to selfishly get across home plate,” as Morey puts it. “If instead of there being a lineup, I could muscle my way to the plate and hit every single time and damage the efficiency of the team — that would be the analogy.”

Solving this problem in IT means rethinking the rules of IT.

The game of IT has, for the last few decades, been determined by the need to deliver large, enterprise applications into the IT estate. Keep the lights on, don’t lose orders, and automate anything that hasn’t yet been automated. Oh — and I’d like my reports accurate and on time. IT as the game of operational engineering. It was these rules that drove the creation of most of the roles we have in enterprise IT today.

However, this has changed. Decisions are now more important than data, and the global credit crunch is driving us to reconsider the roles we need in IT. We’re trying to reinvent our IT departments for the modern era – I even posted about how this was driving the need the need to manage technology, and not applications – but we haven’t changed the rules to suit.

If we want out people to embrace change, as the people on the shop floor at Toyota did, then we need to provide them with roles and careers that support them in the new normal. And this means changing the rules. Out with the more – more applications, larger projects, more people – and in with the new.

So what are the new rules for IT?

Innovation [2010-02-01]

Another week and another collection of interesting ideas from around the internet.

As always, thoughts and/or comments are greatly appreciated.

Inside vs. Outside

As Andy Mullholland pointed out in a recent post, all too often we manage our businesses by looking out the rear window to see where we’ve been, rather than looking forward to see where we’re going. How we use information too drive informed business decisions has a significant impact on our competitiveness.

I’ve made the point previously (which Andy built on) that not all information is of equal value. Success in today’s rapidly changing and uncertain business environment rests on our ability to make timely, appropriate and decisive action in response to new insights. Execution speed or organizational intelligence are not enough on their own: we need an intimate connection to the environment we operate in. Simply collecting more historical data will not solve the problem. If we want to look out the front window and see where we’re going, then we need to consider external market information, and not just internal historical information, or predictions derived from this information.

A little while ago I wrote about the value of information. My main point was that we tend to think of most information in one of two modes—either transactionally, with the information part of current business operations; or historically, when the information represents past business performance—where it’s more productive to think of an information age continuum.

The value of information
The value of information

Andy Mulholland posted an interesting build on this idea on the Capgemini CTO blog, adding the idea that information from our external environment provides mixed and weak signals, while internal, historical information provides focused and strong signals.

The value of information and internal vs. external drivers
The value of information and internal vs. external drivers

Andy’s major point was that traditional approaches to Business Intelligence (BI) focus on these strong, historical signals, which is much like driving a car by looking out the back window. While this works in a (relatively) unchanging environment (if the road was curving right, then keep turning right), it’s less useful in a rapidly changing environment as we won’t see the unexpected speed bump until we hit it. As Andy commented:

Unfortunately stability and lack of change are two elements that are conspicuously lacking in the global markets of today. Added to which, social and technology changes are creating new ideas, waves, and markets – almost overnight in some cases. These are the ‘opportunities’ to achieve ‘stretch targets’, or even to adjust positioning and the current business plan and budget. But the information is difficult to understand and use, as it is comprised of ‘mixed and weak signals’. As an example, we can look to what signals did the rise of the iPod and iTunes send to the music industry. There were definite signals in the market that change was occurring, but the BI of the music industry was monitoring its sales of CDs and didn’t react until these were impacted, by which point it was probably too late. Too late meaning the market had chosen to change and the new arrival had the strength to fight off the late actions of the previous established players.

We’ve become quite sophisticated at looking out the back window to manage moving forward. A whole class of enterprise applications, Enterprise Performance Management (EPM), has been created to harvest and analyze this data, aligning it with enterprise strategies and targets. With our own quants, we can create sophisticated models of our business, market, competitors and clients to predict where they’ll go next.

Robert K. Merton: Father of Quants
Robert K. Merton: Father of Quants

Despite EPM’s impressive theories and product sheets, it cannot, on its own, help us leverage these new market opportunities. These tools simply cannot predict where the speed bumps in the market, no matter how sophisticated they are.

There’s a simple thought experiment economists use to show the inherent limitations in using mathematical models to simulate the market. (A topical subject given the recent global financial crisis.) Imagine, for a moment, that you have a perfect model of the market; you can predict when and where the market will move with startling accuracy. However, as Sun likes to point out, statistically, the smartest people in your field do not work for your company; the resources in the general market are too big when compared to your company. If you have a perfect model, then you must assume that your competitors also have a perfect model. Assuming you’ll both use these models as triggers for action, you’ll both act earlier, and in possibly the same way, changing the state of the market. The fact that you’ve invented a tool to predicts the speed bumps causes the speed bumps to move. Scary!

Enterprise Performance Management is firmly in the grasp of the law of diminishing returns. Once you have the critical mass of data required to create a reasonable prediction, collecting additional data will have a negligible impact on the quality of this prediction. The harder your quants work, the more sophisticated your models, the larger the volume of data you collect and trawl, the lower the incremental impact will be on your business.

Andy’s point is a big one. It’s not possible to accurately predict future market disruptions with on historical data alone. Real insight is dependent on data sourced from outside the organization, not inside. This is not to diminish the important role BI and EPM play in modern business management, but to highlight that we need to look outside the organization if we are to deliver the next step change in performance.

Zara, a fashion retailer, is an interesting example of this. Rather than attempt to predict or create demand on a seasonal fashion cycle, and deliver product appropriately (an internally driven approach), Zara tracks customer preferences and trends as they happen in the stores and tries to deliver an appropriate design as rapidly as possible (an externally driven approach). This approach has made Zara the most profitable arm of Inditex, a holding company of eight retail brands, and one of the biggest success stories in Spanish business. You could say that Quants are out, and Blink is in.

At this point we can return to my original goal: creating a simple graphic that captures and communicates what drives the value of information. Building on both my own and Andy’s ideas we can create a new chart. This chart needs to capture how the value of information is effected by age, as well as the impact of externally vs. internally sourced. Using these two factors as dimensions, we can create a heat map capturing information value, as shown below.

Time and distance drive the value of information
Time and distance drive the value of information

Vertically we have the divide between inside and outside: internally created from processes; though information at the surface of our organization, sourced from current customers and partners; to information sourced from the general market and environment outside the organization. Horizontally we have information age, from information we obtain proactively (we think that customer might want a product), through reactively (the customer has indicated that they want a product) to historical (we sold a product to a customer). Highest value, in the top right corner, represents the external market disruption that we can tap into. Lowest value (though still important) represents an internal transactional processes.

As an acid test, I’ve plotted some of the case studies mentioned in to the conversation so far on a copy of this diagram.

  • The maintenance story I used in my original post. Internal, historical data lets us do predictive maintenance on equipment, while  external data enables us to maintain just before (detected) failure. Note: This also applies tasks like vegetation management (trimming trees to avoid power lines), as real time data and be used to determine where vegetation is a problem, rather than simply eyeballing the entire power network.
  • The Walkman and iPod examples from Andy’s follow-up post. Check out Snake Coffee for a discussion on how information driven the evolution of the Walkman.
  • The Walmart Telxon story, using floor staff to capture word of mouth sales.
  • The example from my follow-up (of Andy’s follow-up), of Albert Heijn (a Dutch Supermarket group) lifting the pricing of ice cream and certain drinks when the temperature goes above 25° C.
  • Netflix vs. (traditional) Blockbuster (via. Nigel Walsh in the comments), where Netflix helps you maintain a list of files you would like to see, rather than a more traditional brick-and-morter store which reacts to your desire to see a film.

Send me any examples that you know of (or think of) and I’ll add them to the acid test chart.

An acid test for our chart
An acid test for our chart

An interesting exercise left to the reader is to map Peter Drucker’s Seven Drivers for change onto the same figure.

Update: A discussion with a different take on the value of information is happening over at the Information Architects.

Update: The latest instalment in this thread is Working from the outside in.

Update: MIT Sloan Management Review weighs in with an interesting article on How to make sense of weak signals.

Why we can’t keep up

We’re struggling to keep up. The pace of business seems to be constantly accelerating. Requirements don’t just slip anymore: they can change completely during the delivery of a solution. And the application we spent the last year nudging over the line into production became instant legacy before we’d even finished. We know intuitively that only a fraction of the benefits written into the business case will be realized. What do we need to do to get back on top of this situation?

We used to operate in a world where applications were delivered on time and on budget. One where the final solution provided a demonstrable competitive advantage to the business. Like SABER, and airline reservation system developed for American Airlines by IBM which was so successful that the rest of the industry was forced to deploy similar solutions (which IBM kindly offered to develop) in response. Or Walmart, who used a data warehouse to drive category leading supply chain excellence, which they leveraged to become the largest retailer in the world. Both of these solutions were billion dollar investments in todays money.

The applications we’ve delivered have revolutionized information distribution both within and between organizations. The wave of data warehouse deployments triggered by Walmart’s success formed the backbone for category management. By providing suppliers with a direct feed from the data warehouse—a view of supply chain state all the way from the factory through to the tills—retailers were able to hand responsibility for transport, shelf-stacking, pricing and even store layout for a product category to their suppliers, resulting in a double digit rises in sales figures.

This ability to rapidly see and act on information has accelerated the pulse of business. What used to take years now takes months. New tools such as Web 2.0 and pervasive mobile communications are starting to convert these months into week.

Take the movie industry for example. Back before the rise of the Internet even bad films could expect a fair run at the box-office, given a star billing and strong PR campaign too attract the punters. However, post Internet, SMS and Twitter, the bad reviews have started flying into punters hands moments after the first screening of a film has started, transmitted directly from the first audience. Where the studios could rely a month or of strong returns, now that run might only last hours.

To compensate, the studios are changing how they take films to market; running more intensive PR campaigns for their lesser offerings, clamping down on leaks, and hoping to make enough money to turn a small profit before word of mouth kicks in. Films are launched, distributed and released to DVD (or even iTunes) in weeks rather than months or years, and studios’ funding, operations and the distribution models are being reconfigured to support the accelerated pace of business.

While the pulse of business has accelerated, enterprise technology’s pulse rate seems to have barely moved. The significant gains we’ve made in technology and methodologies has been traded for the ability to build increasingly complex solutions, the latest being ERP (enterprise resource planning) whose installation in a business is often compared to open heart surgery.

The Diverging Pulse Rates of Business and Technology

This disconnect between the pulse rates of business and enterprise technology is the source of our struggle. John Boyd found his way to the crux of the problem with his work on fighter tactics.

John Boyd—also know as “40 second Boyd”—was a rather interesting bloke. He had a standing bet for 40 dollars that he beat any opponent within 40 seconds in a dog fight. Boyd never lost his bet.

The key to Boyd’s unblemished record was a single insight: that success in rapidly changing environment depends on your ability to orient yourself, decide on, and execute a course of action, faster than the environment (or your competition) is changing. He used his understanding of the current environment—the relative positions, speed and performance envelopes of both planes—to quickly orient himself then select and act on a tactic. By repeatedly taking decisive action faster than his opponent can react, John Boyd’s actions were confusing and unpredictable to his opponent.

We often find ourselves on the back foot, reacting to seemingly chaotic business environment. To overcome this we need to increase the pulse of IT so that we’re operating at a higher pace than the business we support. Tools like LEAN software development have provided us with a partial solution, accelerating the pulse of writing software, but if we want to overcome this challenge then we need to find a new approach to managing IT.

Business, however, doesn’t have a single pulse. Pulse rate varies by industry. It also varies within a business. Back office compliance runs at a slow rate, changing over years as reporting and regulation requirements slowly evolve. Process improvement and operational excellence programs evolve business processes over months or quarters to drive cost out of the business. While customer or knowledge worker facing functionality changes rapidly, possibly even weekly, in response to consumer, marketing or workforce demands.

Aligning technology with business

We can manage each of these pulses separately. Rather than using a single approach to managing technology and treating all business drivers as equals, we can segment the business and select management strategies to match the pulse rate and amplitude of each.

Sales, for example, is often victim of an over zealous CRM (customer relationship management) deployment. In an effort to improve sales performance we’ll decide to role out the latest-greatest CRM solution. The one with the Web 2.0 features and funky cross-sell, up-sell module.

Only of a fraction of the functionality in the new CRM solution is actually new though—the remainder being no different to the existing solution. The need to support 100% of the investment on the benefits provided by a small fraction of the solution’s features dilutes the business case. Soon we find ourselves on the same old roller-coaster ride, with delivery running late,  scope creeping up, the promised benefits becoming more intangible every minute, and we’re struggling to keep up.

There might be an easier way. Take the drugs industry for example. Sales are based on relationships and made via personal calls on doctors. Sales performance is driven by the number of sales calls a representative can manage in a week, and the ability to answer all of a doctor’s questions during a visit (and avoid the need for a follow-up visit to close the sale). It’s not uncommon for tasks unrelated to CRM—simple tasks such as returning to the office to process expenses or find an answer to a question—to consume a disproportionate amount of time. Time that would be better spent closing sales.

One company came up with an interesting approach. To support the sales reps in the field they provided them with the ability to query the team back in the office, answering a clients question without the need to return to head office and then try to get back in their calendar. The solution was to deploy a corporate version of Twitter, connecting the sales rep into the with the call center and all staff using the company portal via a simple text message.

By separating concerns in this way—by managing each appropriately—we can ensure that we are working at a faster pace than the business driver we supporting. By allocating our resources wisely we can set the amplitude of each pulse. Careful management of the cycles will enable us to bring business and technology into alignment.

The Value of Enterprise Architecture

Note: Updated with the slides and script from 2011’s lecture.

Is Enterprise Architecture in danger of becoming irrelevant? And if so, what can we do about it?

Presented as part of RMIT’s Master of Technology (Enterprise Architecture) course.

The Value of Enterprise Architecture

Applications let us differentiate, not!

Being involved in enterprise IT, we tend to think that the applications we build, install and maintain will provide a competitive advantage to the companies we work for.

Take Walmart, for example. During the early 80s, Walmart invested heavily in creating a data warehouse to help it analyze its end-to-end supply chain. The data was used to statically optimize Walmart’s supply chain, creating the most efficient, lowest cost supply chain in the world at the time. Half the savings were passed on to Walmart’s customers, half whet directly to the bottom line, and the rest is history. The IT asset, the data warehouse, enabled Walmart to differentiate, while the investment and time required to develop the data warehouse created a barrier to competition. Unfortunately this approach doesn’t work anymore.

Fast forward to the recent past. The market for enterprise applications has grown tremendously since Walmart first brought that data warehouse online. Today, applications providing solutions to most business problems are available from a range of vendors, and at a fraction of the cost required for the first bespoke solutions that blazed the enterprise application trail. Walmart even replaced that original bespoke supply chain data warehouse, which had become something of an expensive albatross, with an off-the-rack solution. How is it possible for enterprise applications to provide a competitive advantage if we’re all buying from the same vendors?

One argument is that differentiation rests in how we use enterprise applications, rather than in the applications themselves. Think of the manufacturing industries (to use a popular analogy at the moment). If two companies have access to identical factories, then they can still make different, and differentiated, products. Now think of enterprise applications as business process factories. Instead of turning out products, we use these factories to turn out business processes. These digital process factories are very flexible. Even if we all start with the same basic functionality, if I’m smarter at configuring the factory, then I’ll get ahead over time and create a competitive advantage.

This analogy is so general that it’s hard to disagree with. Yes, enterprise applications are (mostly) commodities so any differentiation they might provide now rests in how you use them. However, this is not a simple question of configuration and customization. The problem is a bit more nuanced than that.

Many companies make the mistake that customizing (code changes etc) their unique business processes into an application will provide them with a competitive advantage. Unfortunately the economics of the enterprise software market mean that they are more likely to have created an albatross for their enterprise, than provided a competitive advantage.

Applications are typically parameterized bespoke solutions. (Many of the early enterprise applications were bespoke COBOL solutions where some of the static information—from company name through shop floor configuration—has been pushed into databases as configuration parameters. ) The more configuration parameters provided by the vendor, the more you can bend the application to a shape that suits you.

Each of these configuration parameters requires and investment of time and effort to develop and maintain. They complicate the solution, pushing up its maintenance cost. This leads vendors to try and minimize the number of configuration points they provide to a set of points that will meet most, but not all customers’ needs. In practical terms, it is not possible to configure an application to let you differentiate in a meaningful way. The configuration space is simply too small.

Some companies resort to customizing the application—changing its code—to get their “IP” in. While this might give you a solution reflecting how your business runs today, every customization takes you further from a packaged solution (low cost, easy to maintain, relatively straight forward to upgrade …) and closer to a bespoke solution (high cost, expensive to maintain, difficult or impossible to upgrade). I’ve worked with a number of companies where an application is so heavily customized that it is impossible to deploy vendor patches and/or upgrades. The application that was supposed to help them differentiate had become an expensive burden.

Any advantage to be wrung from enterprise IT now comes from the gaps between applications, not from the applications themselves. Take supply chain for example. Most large businesses have deployed planning and supply chain management solutions, and have been on either the LEAN or Six Sigma journey. Configuring your planning solution slightly differently to your competitors is not going to provide much of an edge, as we’re all using the same algorithms, data models and planning drivers to operate our planning process.

Most of the potential for differentiation now lies with the messier parts of the process, such as exception management (the people who deal with stock-outs and lost or delayed shipments). If I can bring together a work environment that makes my exception managers more productive than yours—responding more rapidly and accurately to exceptions—then I’ve created a competitive advantage as my supply chain is now more agile than yours. If I can capture what it is that my exception managers do, their non-linear and creative problem solving process, automate it, and use this to create time and space for my exception managers to continuously improve how supply chain disruptions are handled, then I’ve created a sustainable competitive advantage. (This is why Enterprise 2.0 is so exciting, since a lot of this IP in this space is tacit information or collaboration.)

Simply configuring an application with today’s best practice—how your company currently does stuff—doesn’t cut it. You need to understand the synergies between your business and the technologies available, and find ways to exploit these synergies. The trick is to understand the 5% that really makes your company different, and then reconfiguring both the business and technology to amplify this advantage while commoditizing the other 95%. Rolls-Royce (appears to be) a great example of getting this right. Starting life as an manufacturer of aircraft engines, Rolls Royce has leveraged its deep understanding of how aircraft engines work (from design through operation and maintenance), reifying this knowledge in a business and IT estate that can provide clients with a service to keep their aircraft moving.